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The Battle of Flodden or Flodden Field was fought in the county of Northumberland, in northern England on September 9, 1513, between an invading Scots army under King James IV and an English army commanded by Thomas Howard, Earl of Surrey. It ended in a bloody defeat for the Scots and was the largest battle (in terms of numbers) fought between the two nations.Background
This conflict began when King James declared war on England, to honour the Auld Alliance and to divert Henry VIII's English troops from their campaign against the French king Louis XII. England was involved in a larger conflict; defending Italy and the Pope from the French, (see Italian Wars), as a member of the "Catholic League". Using the pretext of revenge for the murder of Robert Kerr, a warden of the Scottish East March, who had been killed by John "The bastard" Heron in 1508, James of Scotland invaded England with an army of about 30,000 men.
The battle actually took place near the village of Branxton, in the county of Northumberland, rather than at Flodden — hence the alternative name of Battle of Branxton. The Scots had previously been stationed at Flodden Edge, to the south of Branxton.
The battle actually took place near the village of Branxton, in the county of Northumberland, rather than at Flodden — hence the alternative name of Battle of Branxton. The Scots had previously been stationed at Flodden Edge, to the south of Branxton.
James Crosses the Border
With his muster complete King James crossed the border on August 22. Most of the soldiers who came with him were armed with the eighteen foot Continental pike, some six feet longer than the traditional Scottish schiltron spear. In the hands of the Swiss and German landsknechts these weapons had acquired a fearsome reputation; but they could only be used to effect in highly disciplined formations. James was accompanied by the French captain the comte d'Aussi with some forty of his fellow countrymen, who had helped to train the Scots in the use of the weapon. It is open to question, though, if the Scots infantrymen had been given enough time to master the new techniques of battle or, indeed, if the countryside into which they were advancing would allow them to make the best use of the training they had received.
Following in the wake of the army came master gunner Robert Borthwick with the artillery, seventeen guns in all, which required 400 oxen to drag them from Edinburgh. The majestic old bombard, Mons Meg, more trouble than she was worth, was left behind. Even so, the whole Scots artillery train was too heavy for a field campaign, and only slowed down the progress of the army. Although the big guns could batter down castle walls, they were difficult to manoeuvre in battle conditions. Moreover, these weapons had to be handled with skill to make them effective: unfortunately James had sent off his best gunners with the fleet.
James' army was composed in large part of raw recruits. Many had been demoralised by the high casualties sustained by the assault on Norham Castle, to which James laid siege soon after crossing the border. To make matters worse, the weather was deplorable, continuing wet and windy throughout the whole campaign. Disease began to spread and morale slumped still further. Gathering whatever spoils they could, many simply decided to make their way home. By early September men were arriving back in Edinburgh in such numbers that the town council was forced to issue a proclamation: "We charge straitli and command in our Soverane Lord the Kingis name that all manner of persons that ar cummyng fra his army that thai address thame and returne againe thairto."
Following in the wake of the army came master gunner Robert Borthwick with the artillery, seventeen guns in all, which required 400 oxen to drag them from Edinburgh. The majestic old bombard, Mons Meg, more trouble than she was worth, was left behind. Even so, the whole Scots artillery train was too heavy for a field campaign, and only slowed down the progress of the army. Although the big guns could batter down castle walls, they were difficult to manoeuvre in battle conditions. Moreover, these weapons had to be handled with skill to make them effective: unfortunately James had sent off his best gunners with the fleet.
James' army was composed in large part of raw recruits. Many had been demoralised by the high casualties sustained by the assault on Norham Castle, to which James laid siege soon after crossing the border. To make matters worse, the weather was deplorable, continuing wet and windy throughout the whole campaign. Disease began to spread and morale slumped still further. Gathering whatever spoils they could, many simply decided to make their way home. By early September men were arriving back in Edinburgh in such numbers that the town council was forced to issue a proclamation: "We charge straitli and command in our Soverane Lord the Kingis name that all manner of persons that ar cummyng fra his army that thai address thame and returne againe thairto."
Surrey's March and invitation to James
By early September the Earl of Surrey's muster was complete, and the old general had approximately 26,000 men under his command, made up chiefly of archers and other infantrymen armed with the bill, the English version of the Continental halberd, an eight-foot-long weapon with a fearsome axe-like head, which could be used for cutting and slashing. All were on foot, save for William, Lord Dacre, who had some 1,500 light border horsemen. Surrey was anxious that James would not be allowed to slip away, as he had during his invasion of 1497. To ensure that the Scots king remained, the commander sent a herald from his base near Alnwick, with an invitation to meet in battle on September 9. James responded with his own message, announcing his intention to wait for the Howards until noon on that day.
James's reasons for accepting the challenge are unclear, when most Scottish commanders since Robert Bruce had avoided large set-piece battles with the English unless the circumstances were exceptional. The traditional explanation is that he was blinded by outmoded notions of chivalry and honour, although two other factors may have influenced him.
First, it seems clear that James was confident in the sheer size of his army, which was at least as strong, if not stronger, than that of his enemy. He was proud of his guns and his pikemen, and eager to let them prove themselves in battle. There was always the danger of the English longbow; but many of James' troops were encased in the latest armour or carried heavy wooden shields to counter the effects of the arrow fusilades.
Secondly, he had selected a very strong position in which to meet a frontal attack by Surrey. Just across the River Till from Ford Castle lie the north-eastern outriders of the Cheviots. The highest of these is Flodden Hill, in those days a treeless slope, rising to over 500 feet above sea level. From Flodden, the ground falls away to the north-west, before it rises again to Branxton Hill. To the west the approach is covered by Moneylaws Hill. The whole position resembles a huge irregular horseshoe shape, with the open end facing eastwards towards the Till. It was here, in a great natural fortress, that James placed his army. Bannockburn had shown the importance of selecting a good position in battle; but the Flodden position was, if anything, too strong: any attempt at direct assault would have been military suicide. James was no Bruce, and Surrey was no Hotspur.
James's reasons for accepting the challenge are unclear, when most Scottish commanders since Robert Bruce had avoided large set-piece battles with the English unless the circumstances were exceptional. The traditional explanation is that he was blinded by outmoded notions of chivalry and honour, although two other factors may have influenced him.
First, it seems clear that James was confident in the sheer size of his army, which was at least as strong, if not stronger, than that of his enemy. He was proud of his guns and his pikemen, and eager to let them prove themselves in battle. There was always the danger of the English longbow; but many of James' troops were encased in the latest armour or carried heavy wooden shields to counter the effects of the arrow fusilades.
Secondly, he had selected a very strong position in which to meet a frontal attack by Surrey. Just across the River Till from Ford Castle lie the north-eastern outriders of the Cheviots. The highest of these is Flodden Hill, in those days a treeless slope, rising to over 500 feet above sea level. From Flodden, the ground falls away to the north-west, before it rises again to Branxton Hill. To the west the approach is covered by Moneylaws Hill. The whole position resembles a huge irregular horseshoe shape, with the open end facing eastwards towards the Till. It was here, in a great natural fortress, that James placed his army. Bannockburn had shown the importance of selecting a good position in battle; but the Flodden position was, if anything, too strong: any attempt at direct assault would have been military suicide. James was no Bruce, and Surrey was no Hotspur.
Flodden Edge
On September 6 the English army entered the valley of the Till. From here they had a clear view of the Scots a few miles to the west. To Surrey the strength of the enemy position was immediately obvious. The Trewe Encountre, an account written soon after the battle, describes what he saw;
The Kyng of Scottes did lye with his army in the egge of Cheviotte and was enclosed in thre parties, with three great mountaynes soe that ther was noe passage nor entre unto hym but oon waye where was laied marvelous and great ordenance of gonnes.
For a second time, Surrey sent his herald, complaining that James had taken a position "more like a fortress", and inviting him to do battle on the level plain at nearby Milfield. Naturally enough, James refused. By now it was certain that James wanted a battle. Even so, it was to be a battle on his terms: Surrey must come to him; he would not go to Surrey. Ironically, from what is known of the coming battle, James might have fared better if he had indeed accepted Surrey's invitation, and allowed his pikemen the advantage of a 'level plain'.
Surrey was faced with a stark choice. Running short of supplies, he would either have to abandon the field or take the risky step of outflanking the Scots by marching to the north and west, and taking a position across James' lines of communication. This would have the effect of forcing him out of his present position in a rapid march back towards the border. The fact that James did not abandon Flodden, or was only able to do so when it was far too late, was to give England one of the most complete victories over Scotland in her history.
Surrey began his march on the evening of September 8. During the following morning, his army crossed the Till in two places. The leading part of the army (the divisions of Edmund Howard and Thomas Howard, the Lord Admiral, with most of the artillery) crossed at Twizel Bridge; the remainder (Surrey's, Dacre's and Stanley's troops) at Milford Ford nearby. They then marched south towards Branxton Hill.
The Kyng of Scottes did lye with his army in the egge of Cheviotte and was enclosed in thre parties, with three great mountaynes soe that ther was noe passage nor entre unto hym but oon waye where was laied marvelous and great ordenance of gonnes.
For a second time, Surrey sent his herald, complaining that James had taken a position "more like a fortress", and inviting him to do battle on the level plain at nearby Milfield. Naturally enough, James refused. By now it was certain that James wanted a battle. Even so, it was to be a battle on his terms: Surrey must come to him; he would not go to Surrey. Ironically, from what is known of the coming battle, James might have fared better if he had indeed accepted Surrey's invitation, and allowed his pikemen the advantage of a 'level plain'.
Surrey was faced with a stark choice. Running short of supplies, he would either have to abandon the field or take the risky step of outflanking the Scots by marching to the north and west, and taking a position across James' lines of communication. This would have the effect of forcing him out of his present position in a rapid march back towards the border. The fact that James did not abandon Flodden, or was only able to do so when it was far too late, was to give England one of the most complete victories over Scotland in her history.
Surrey began his march on the evening of September 8. During the following morning, his army crossed the Till in two places. The leading part of the army (the divisions of Edmund Howard and Thomas Howard, the Lord Admiral, with most of the artillery) crossed at Twizel Bridge; the remainder (Surrey's, Dacre's and Stanley's troops) at Milford Ford nearby. They then marched south towards Branxton Hill.
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